Donald Trump’s return to power is a crucial factor shaping Europeans’ geopolitical expectations. Almost half of the Europeans surveyed (49% in France) believe that his presidency will make peace in Ukraine less likely or that the situation will remain the same.
This is stated in the study “Ukraine in the Eyes of Europeans: Analysis and Strategic Recommendations (2022-2025 )” (August 2025), conducted by the NGO “Foundation for the Promotion of Democracy ” with the support of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Ukraine as part of theUkrainian Security Club.
There is an interesting paradox: in some European countries, including Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, as well as Estonia, Italy, and Ukraine itself, a significant number of people believe that Trump will be able to bring peace. This reflects a desperate desire to end the conflict, even if the conditions may not be very favorable.
According to a study by the Groupe d’études géopolitiques (March 2025), 51% of Europeans consider Trump an “enemy of Europe,” while only 9% see him as a “friend.” This distrust is fueling the desire for European autonomy: 71% of citizens believe that EU countries should buy military equipment from each other to strengthen European sovereignty.
From glorification to compromise: the evolution of expectations
Three years of full-scale war have radically changed the perception of Ukraine in Europe. The initial phase of 2022 was characterized by almost unanimous empathy: over 90% of Europeans supported humanitarian aid (≈93%) and about 90% supported the reception of Ukrainian refugees (≈88%). Over time, this emotional impulse began to give way to more pragmatic expectations. The need for transparent goals, tangible cost-effectiveness, and a clear link between support for Ukraine and the security of Europe itself came to the fore.
The most notable changes have occurred in expectations regarding the end of the war. The most common expectation among the European public is a “compromise settlement” between Kyiv and Moscow. This opinion has become the leading one in all the countries surveyed, including hawkish states such as Estonia, Denmark, Poland, the United Kingdom, and even in Ukraine itself (ECFR, February 2025).
This change is particularly striking in light of Ukrainian sentiment. According to Gallup (July 2025), 69% of Ukrainians favor a negotiated end to the war as soon as possible, while only 24% support continuing the fight to victory. This is an almost complete change from 2022, when 73% supported the fight to victory.
At the same time, the understanding of “compromise” varies considerably from country to country. In some countries, many people believe that peace negotiations are the “most likely” outcome of a war, but not the “best” outcome for their countries or for world peace. This trend is particularly pronounced in Northern Europe.
Three camps: the split within Europe
The main split in Europe is between countries that want to support Ukraine in its struggle (e.g., Denmark, Estonia, Poland, and the United Kingdom) and those that are inclined to peace talks.
- The “continuation of the struggle” camp: Denmark is the only country where the majority of citizens prefer the continuation of the conflict to peace, which could lead to the loss of Ukrainian territories. Poland stands out with a high level of support for significant investment in defense – 62%.
- The “negotiations with guarantees” camp: Some countries, such as Spain, believe that Ukraine should first be invited to join NATO to provide it with reliable security guarantees before negotiations can begin.
- The “negotiations without conditions” camp: Others, especially Bulgaria and Hungary, favor pushing Kyiv to negotiate without preconditions. In Italy, 62% of respondents believe that there are more pressing expenses than defense.
Questions of responsibility and the future
Different views on responsibility for the war also create divisions. Respondents in some countries (especially Bulgaria and Hungary) who have a generally positive attitude toward Russia tend to believe that Ukraine bears some, most, or all of the responsibility for the continuation of the war.
This will have practical consequences: after any peace agreement, the governments of these countries will try to “reset” relations with Russia, which other countries, such as Poland or Germany, will find unacceptable.
There are also differences of opinion about Ukraine’s European integration. About half of respondents in France and Italy doubt that Ukraine is part of Europe. This fundamental question of identity affects the willingness to support integration processes.
Support dynamics: stabilization at a lower level
According to a Eurofound poll, the level of war anxiety, which was high in 2022, declined in 2023 and stabilized in 2024. This stabilization occurred at a less emotional level.
Attitudes toward refugees have changed significantly. The share of respondents who believe that their governments are doing “too much” for Ukrainian refugees has increased by 7.9% over two years. The drop in support is especially noticeable among people with economic instability and those who receive news from social media. Less authoritative and biased sources circulating on social media have contributed to growing discontent and uncertainty about the war.
The Ukrainian view: disappointment and adaptation
Along with the changes in Europe, Ukrainian society is also transforming. In 2025, only 16% of Ukrainians approve of U.S. leadership, while 73% disapprove, a record high. In contrast, the perception of Germany has improved significantly, with approval of Berlin’s leadership reaching 63%.
Expectations of integration into the EU and NATO have become more realistic. Only 52% of Ukrainians believe in EU membership within 10 years (compared to 73% in 2022-2023). As for NATO, hopes for rapid accession fell to 32% in 2025, and the share of those who believe that Ukraine will never be accepted into the Alliance increased to 33%.
The dynamics of 2022-2025 show a profound transformation: from emotional mobilization to fatigue and pragmatism. There is significant potential for splits between Europe and the US and within the EU, especially if peace talks fail or lead to an extremely unfavorable outcome for Ukraine.
This situation requires new approaches from Ukrainian diplomacy: it is necessary to work with different groups of European public opinion, to form realistic expectations and to look for new partnership formats in the context of “transatlantic twilight” and internal European fragmentation.
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