The Russian-Ukrainian war has turned a large part of the Ukrainian front into a positional confrontation similar to the conflicts of the mid-20th century. In such conditions, classical defense – sitting in trenches and only reacting to attacks – often leads to heavy losses and the risk of enemy breakthroughs. At the same time, the experience of this war has shown that the transition to active defense, including the use of assault units, makes it possible to successfully deter offensives.
Specially trained assault units can not only hold their positions but also suddenly counterattack the enemy, knocking them out of their foothold or forcing them to redeploy forces to vulnerable areas of the front. The tactics of “small war” in defense – the actions of mobile assault groups – have become especially relevant in modern conditions and have already proven their effectiveness. This article analyzes the benefits of the transition to the use of assault units in defense operations, using the examples of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (33rd Air Assault Brigade, 225th Air Assault Brigade, 425th Air Assault Brigade), compares this approach with traditional positional defense, considers historical analogies, and includes the opinions of experts and military personnel.
The role of assault units in the current war
During the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian Defense Forces created a number of separate assault units designed to act unconventionally and aggressively even in defensive battles. The 33rd, 225th, and 425th separate assault regiments (formerly battalions) are striking examples. Their combat path shows how assault units strengthen the defense through active operations.
The 33rd Separate Assault Regiment (33rd Separate Assault Regiment ) was formed in late 2023 as a battalion that within a few months had already fought in Kharkiv region, on the border with the Kursk region of the Russian Federation, and in Donetsk region.
The 33rd separate assault regiment is one of the most effective assault units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The regiment was put into operation by the directive of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine dated December 22, 2023, No. 321/124/dsk. Its founder, Valentyn Mankois a Hero of Ukraine and personally invests his own funds in the development of the unit.
Since its inception, the 33rd Separate Special Forces Unit has taken an active part in the fiercest combat operations, demonstrating high efficiency and maneuverability in performing its tasks. The main stages of the unit’s combat path include:
- Kharkiv operation: storming the village of Hlyboke, defense of Lyptsi, battles for Vovchansk and the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant.
- Kursk operation: offensive actions in the areas of Sudzha, Rubanshchyna, Mykhailivka, Myrne, Kruglennoye, Kremiane, Olhivka and other settlements.
- Donetsk sector: participation in the Pokrovsk tactical group, storming of the settlements of Dale, Petrivka, Zelene, battles near Novotroitske, Novopusynka, Ivanivka, Novyi Komar and Pishchane.
- Return to the Kharkiv direction: Lyman, Kupyansk.
- Return to Kursk and battles against North Korean troops.
- Returning to the Donetsk direction in the most difficult period.
The 33rd Brigade began its combat service as part of the Kharkiv Joint Task Force. The unit stormed the village of Hlyboke and then took part in the defense of Lyptsi. The defining moment of the operation was the participation in the assault on the aggregate plant in Vovchansk, which significantly complicated the enemy’s logistics and deprived them of a strategically important facility.
Many soldiers of the 33rd Brigade were awarded state decorations for their impeccable performance of tasks in the Kharkiv operation.
During the Kursk operation, the 33rd Brigade was part of the Siversk Task Force and carried out assault operations in the areas of Sudzha, Rubanshchyna, Mykhailivka, and Myrne. The soldiers of the 33rd became the first Ukrainian military to enter Sudzha, opening a new front in the Russian Federation.
During the operation, the unit carried out active offensive and clearing operations in Martynivka, Ruske Porechne, Kalynivka, and repelled enemy assaults in Zhuravlya and Kamyshevka. After that, the 33rd Regiment’s attack aircraft conducted active offensive operations in the area of Novyi Puty and Vesele, consolidating their positions.
In the Kursk operation, the tactics of maneuver groups were particularly evident: Ukrainian troops used aerial reconnaissance and artillery strikes before the assault groups entered enemy positions. Thanks to its high level of coordination, the unit eliminated significant enemy forces, including North Korean troops who fought according to old Soviet doctrines – without maneuvering, just moving forward.
After the Kursk operation, the 33rd Brigade moved to the Donetsk sector, where it continued to perform combat missions. At the front line, the unit operated as part of the Pokrovsk tactical group and participated in the assaults on the village of Dalne, Petrivka and Zelene. Thanks to their coordinated and decisive actions, the assault troops were able to break through the enemy’s defense lines.
In addition, the 33rd Brigade actively conducted offensive operations near Novotroitske and Novopustyanka, methodically advancing despite heavy enemy fire. High motivation, training and combat experience allowed the regiment to retain the initiative and inflict significant losses on the enemy.
Later, the unit returned to Kharkiv region, where it continued to perform tasks in the Liman and Kupyansk directions.
Key success factors of the 33rd JSF
- An integrated approach to assault operations: effective interaction with UAVs, artillery, mortars and other units.
- Flexibility and maneuverability: rapid movement of the unit between combat areas allows it to respond effectively to threats.
- Professional approach to personnel training: rigorous training and emphasis on tactical initiative.
One of the examples of the actions of this unit’s stormtroopers available in open sources is a successful operation to capture a dugout of the Russian occupiers in Kharkiv region.
The attack was a comprehensive one: first, artillery and drones suppressed enemy firing points, drones adjusted strikes and coordinated infantry, and then the assault group quickly approached the stronghold. The Ukrainian soldiers threw hand grenades at the enemy’s dugout, preventing the enemy from raising his head, and knocked him out of the fortification.
At the same time, the stormtroopers had to repel counterattacks – the enemy tried to regain the lost position, but the soldiers of the 33rd Separate Mechanized Brigade held it even under pressure and became a field regiment even before the official reformatting.
This episode demonstrates the value of assault operations in defense: instead of passively waiting for an attack, the assault unit proactively destroyed the enemy’s stronghold, improved its tactical position and disrupted the enemy’s plans. The effectiveness of the 33rd Battalion was recognized by its expansion – in December 2024, it officially became the 33rd Assault Regiment, which opens up more opportunities to strengthen the unit’s combat capabilities, as noted by the unit’s command.
The unit’s founder and commander since its inception has been the Hero of Ukraine Valentyn Manko, who volunteered for the war in 2014 and tested and proved the effectiveness of small tactical assault groups. Now he is working on scaling up this experience and improving it.
The 225th Separate Assault Regiment (225th Separate Assault Regiment ) is one of the most striking examples of the evolution of a defensive unit into an offensive and defensive one. It was created at the beginning of the invasion, on March 8, 2022, as the 225th Kharkiv Territorial Defense Battalion. Initially, these were volunteers defending their hometown, but in less than a year, the unit turned into a separate assault battalion within the Army.
This unit fought fierce defensive battles near Bakhmut and Chasovyi Yar, as well as held the critical “road of life” to Avdiivka. In particular, in February 2024, the 225th Battalion defended the village of Lastochkino near Avdiivka and prevented the enemy from cutting the last communication to the city. According to reviews, the soldiers of the 225th Brigade showed resilience and saved the situation in this area. Moreover, in May 2024, the 225th’s assault troopers were able to capture a trophy – the latest Russian T-90M Breakthrough tank – by taking advantage of a probable mistake by the enemy crew. The capture of an entire combat-ready T-90M shows that Ukrainian assault groups are capable of switching from defense to decisive attacks, even against enemy armored vehicles.
The 225th Brigade also played a significant role in the defense of the flanks of Bakhmut. It is known that the unit fought for several months in the Bakhmut area, and in July 2024, its fighters, together with the Marines, broke out of a 70-day semi-siege near Chasovyi Yar. Holding a circular defense for 70 days and eventually breaking out is an exceptional achievement that emphasizes the high morale and cohesion of the stormtroopers. After regaining its strength in the summer of 2024, the battalion significantly expanded its personnel. Already in August 2024, the command involved the 225th Separate Assault Battalion in a daring operation outside Ukraine – a raid into the Kursk region of the Russian Federation. The unit acted as a breakthrough unit, breaking through the enemy’s defenses and penetrating deeper into Russian territory from the first days of the operation. On August 6, 2024, the 225th’s assault troops crossed the border, taking control of the border village of Daryino. They acted quickly and decisively: on August 11, the 225th Brigade captured a group of about 8 Russian soldiers, presumably an entire command post of a Russian battalion. Also during the raid, the Black Swan assault unit (a strike group within the battalion) knocked out Kadyrov’s men and announced the liberation of another settlement, Lyubymivka, Kursk region.
In early February 2025, this assault battalion was officially reorganized into the 225th Separate Assault Regiment – over the three years of war, the unit grew from a terrorist defense unit to a regiment directly subordinate to the Land Forces Command. This path demonstrates the great confidence of the Armed Forces leadership in the format of assault units.
The 425th Separate Assault Regiment “Skala” (425th Separate Assault Regiment ) started as a volunteer reconnaissance and assault unit and also came in handy in defense operations. The Skala unit was formed in 2022 and specialized in aerial reconnaissance and assault. Already in September 2022, Skala’s fighters distinguished themselves during the Slobozhansk counteroffensive, being among the first to enter the liberated settlements of Brazhkivka and Izyum in the Kharkiv region. The experience in deep reconnaissance and surprise attacks they gained then would serve them well in the future. In 2023-2024, the 425th Separate Assault Battalion was active in the Donetsk region. In particular, in July 2024, the Skala assault battalion conducted a series of lightning operations near Vuhledar and Toretsk. In the Vuhledar area, a battalion group using an M2 Bradley combat vehicle conducted a night raid deep into the occupiers’ positions. With a swift strike, they drove the enemy out of the stronghold: two Russians were killed and eight captured.
In the fall of 2024, the 425th Battalion continued its active defense in the south of Donetsk region. On December 7, 2024, its fighters cleared the village of Rozdolne near Velyka Novosilka from the occupiers in a surprise counterattack, destroying a Russian assault group and taking two prisoners. This localized offensive within the framework of a defensive operation not only drove the enemy back, but also improved the tactical position of the Ukrainian side on this section of the front. In December 2024, the Skala attack aircraft carried out another important operation in the Donetsk region: they drove the enemy out of the village of Shevchenko near Pokrovsk. Russian troops were trying to gain a foothold in this village to create a springboard for an offensive towards Pokrovsk. The 425th Battalion, using infantry on M1117 armored vehicles and tanks, successfully stormed and cleared Shevchenko of enemy units
. This eliminated the threat to the important logistics center of Pokrovsk. In early 2025, the Skala battalion also received reinforcements (including Leopard 1A5 tanks and additional artillery) and was deployed to a regiment. In effect, the Ukrainian command turned the 425th Brigade into another regimental-level strike force, given its significant contribution to deterring the enemy on the southern front.
Thus, in each of the above cases, assault units acted as a “fire brigade” of defense: when regular units held back a massive offensive, assault aircraft launched a counterattack in certain areas, knocking the enemy out of their strongholds or even entering their rear. This disrupted the enemy’s plans for an offensive and forced them to lose the initiative. The combat achievements of the 33rd, 225th and 425th assault units – captured strongholds, trophy equipment, dozens of prisoners – clearly demonstrate the benefits of active defense. It is no coincidence that these battalions were reinforced and expanded into regiments. The Ukrainian Armed Forces command is increasingly convinced that the format of separate assault units has proven itself in practice, especially in the most difficult areas of the front. From the Kharkiv region to Donbas, assault troops have become a flexible force that can change the course of a defense operation.
Comparison with other defense approaches
In traditional military science, defense is often perceived as a passive phase: troops occupy fortified lines, dig trenches, mine approaches, and wait for the enemy to attack. Such a positional defense was typical of the First World War and partly of the Second World War-it allows you to exhaust the enemy on prepared lines, but it also has significant drawbacks. When the enemy has a numerical advantage or powerful artillery, static defenses can be broken through or surrounded. Ukraine’s experience in the first months of the invasion showed that simply “holding on to the last” without maneuvering can lead to operational encirclement (as happened, for example, in June 2022 during the battles for Sievierodonetsk-Lysychansk). Therefore, the Armed Forces command was looking for ways to make the defense more flexible and proactive. In fact, the creation of separate assault units was a response to this challenge.
Active defense with the use of assault groups is qualitatively different from passive line holding. First, it involves a constant search for vulnerabilities in the enemy’s combat formations. If enemy assault operations are concentrated in one area, Ukrainian forces can counterattack in another, where the enemy has weakened its cover. For example, during the defense of Bakhmut in 2023, our troops had to maneuver reserves to prevent the enemy from breaking through the flanks. Now, having separate assault units, the Armed Forces are able to carry out such counterattacks with small forces even more effectively. Secondly, assault units on the defense significantly increase unpredictability for the enemy. The Russian army is accustomed to relying on firepower: first, artillery razes the front trenches to the ground, and then infantry and tanks advance. But when they are confronted by mobile Ukrainian groups that suddenly attack in response, the effect of massive artillery is leveled. The enemy is forced to constantly look back at its own flanks and rear. As a result, the pace of his offensive slows down or even stops altogether.
The comparative effectiveness of the two approaches is especially evident when we consider situations where the defenders acted only passively. During the First World War, “sitting” defense led to months of stalemate battles like the Battle of Verdun. In World War II, Soviet troops in 1941, adhering to a rigid defense without withdrawal or maneuver, were surrounded (for example, near Kyiv), and thus lost entire armies. Instead, the German command developed the concept of flexible defense: when the first line of fortifications failed, the defenders retreated to the next line, but immediately sent small assault units to counterattack. Historical research shows that the Wehrmacht “excelled in local counterattacks, quickly retaking villages and positions captured by the enemy; again and again, small groups of German troops effectively blocked the advance of much larger Allied forces.”
It is this approach – an immediate counterattack by small strike groups – that has become the basis of Ukraine’s modern active defense.
Assault units, acting in defense, add maneuverability to the battlefield. While a conventional infantry brigade must hold the front in a continuous line, the presence of attached assault companies or battalions allows for the creation of a mobile reserve ready for a raid or flanking attack. Practice has shown that this saves lives and equipment. For example, when the Black Swan Strike Group (225th Separate Mechanized Brigade) came under unexpected heavy enemy fire in the Kursk region in February 2025, it was able to retreat in an organized manner under the cover of Bradley BMPs without losses.
In a situation where a conventional rifle company might have panicked and retreated with losses, the flexible assault unit retreated in a coordinated manner, using armored vehicles for cover. This confirms that assault units are more effective in managing combat, even in a crisis, due to better coordination with each other and with the equipment.
Another advantage of active defense is its psychological impact. Soldiers who know that in case of a threat, their “assault” will come to their aid feel more confident than those who are sitting in isolation in a trench. The flip side is the demoralization of the enemy when he sees that even if he is outnumbered, he can be hit in the flank at any time. For example, during the 225th Battalion’s raid into the Kursk region, Russian troops were so disoriented that, according to Ukrainian soldiers, “the main effect was complete surprise and misunderstanding [by the Russians] of what was happening and how far it could go.”
Let’s imagine the state of Russian units when, instead of the expected “quiet” rear, they faced Ukrainian stormtroopers at home – clearly not the best motivation to continue the offensive elsewhere.
Of course, the use of assault groups does not negate the importance of engineering preparation of the defense or the work of artillery. But it adds dynamics to the defense. If a classical defense is a strong but immovable shield, then a defense with assault troops is a shield with a sword that can be unexpectedly struck back. A balanced combination of fortifications, firepower, and mobile assault units creates an active defense that has already proven to be superior to a purely positional defense.
Historical experience of other countries
The idea of special assault units operating in defense is not new – its beginnings can be found in the early twentieth century. The First World War taught the army that trench warfare requires small mobile groups to break through positions. In 1917-1918, the German army created Sturmtruppen (assault units) armed with handguns, grenades, and flamethrowers-they were used primarily for offensive operations, but their experience proved the value of specially trained strike teams. The British and French also formed “mopping-up groups” to counterattack in the void of positions that formed after artillery fire.
World War II provided even more examples. Both sides created assault units for heavy fighting. It is noteworthy that they also played a critical role in defensive operations. For example, during the Battle of Stalingrad (1942 ), Soviet troops defending the city organized special assault groups of the bravest soldiers from sapper units and rifle units.
The so-called “assault detachments” of the Red Army at the end of World War II can be considered a telling historical analogue to current events. In 1944-45, when storming German-held cities, Soviet troops formed reinforced assault companies of 150 soldiers, reinforced by tanks (1-2 per detachment), 76-mm guns, platoons of riflemen and flamethrowers. Although these units were used in the offensive (for example, during the storming of Königsberg in April 1945), their organization is also interesting for defensive purposes. In fact, these were “mini-battalions” with their own reinforcement, capable of operating autonomously in a city or fortified area. The modern Russian army, by the way, is trying to copy this model: since February 2023, the Russians have announced the transition from battalion tactical groups to “assault units” at the level of a reinforced company.
In modern conflicts, the idea of active defense has also repeatedly proved effective. For example, in the Arab-Israeli wars, Israel adhered to the doctrine of “the best defense is an offense”: when defending its borders, Israelis often launched preventive strikes or local counterattacks to thwart the enemy’s offensive impulse. Such actions were carried out by mobile armored groups and paratroopers, who actually acted as assault units.
In the Iraq War of 2003-2007, American units, defending bases from constant attacks by militants, created “raid teams” – units of marines or special forces that combed nearby villages and destroyed prepared enemy positions. This significantly reduced the intensity of attacks on the bases themselves.
Another example is the Second Karabakh War of 2020: the Azerbaijani army was advancing, but the Armenian defenders could hold their positions longer when they had their own well-trained special forces that operated flexibly. However, Armenia did not have enough assault mobile groups, and in the end, its purely positional defense lost to the high-tech offensive. This case has become a lesson for many: static defense is inferior to active defense, especially when the enemy uses small strike groups and drones.
Thus, historical experience confirms that armies that skillfully combine defense with local counterattacks by assault forces achieve better results in defense. The current war in Ukraine is no exception, but rather the culmination of this paradigm. Ukrainian assault units continue the best traditions of such formations: they know how to dig in and suddenly go on the offensive, acting ahead of the enemy. Applying historical lessons, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have adapted them to modern conditions with the widespread use of UAVs, precision artillery and armored vehicles, making our assault units even more effective.
Expert opinions and comments from the military
The introduction of assault units into the structure of the Defense Forces has received support from both the military command and analysts. Many experts emphasize that the Ukrainian army, on the initiative of Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, is actually forming a new doctrine of active defense that is already showing results.
The commanders of the assault units themselves note that this approach has a significant impact on the course of the war. Oleh Shiryaev, commander of the 225th Separate Airborne Brigade, called the raid into Kursk Oblast a historic event: “In the last 400 years, this is one of the most serious incursions into enemy territory since Sahaidachny, carried out by Ukrainian troops.”
Military experts also praised the actions of Ukrainian assault units. Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military and political observer of the Information Resistance group, noted that the Kursk operation will go down in history, and the 225th Battalion has become one of the main strike units of this operation. According to Kovalenko, the success of Ukrainian attack aircraft on the territory of the Russian Federation has a significant moral and psychological impact: “part of the Kursk region will remain [under Ukrainian control]. The other issue is the area, because one way or another, the Russians will make advances, but by the end of the year they will not be able to regain all the territory,” the expert said in November 2024, predicting that the Ukrainians would hold the bridgehead in Kursk at least until the new year. His prediction came true, and experts call the fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been present on enemy soil for months unprecedented. This does not mean that Ukraine is planning a large-scale offensive against Russia, but it does show the flexibility of its defense strategy.
Experienced Ukrainian military officers have repeatedly emphasized that effective defense requires initiative at lower levels. In an interview, Pavlo Svyatenko, the former commander of the 93rd Brigade’s intelligence company, noted that “infantrymen in the trenches should not only repel an attack, but also think about how to counterattack if there is a chance” (a principle now being implemented by assault units). Another military analyst, retired colonel Serhiy Grabsky, commenting on the fighting in Donbas, said: “It has become harder for the enemy to attack because the Ukrainian Armed Forces have switched to active defense: counterattacks in small groups do not allow the Russians to accumulate forces for a breakthrough.” Such assessments show that Ukrainian tactics have gained recognition.
The moral aspect is also worth mentioning. A fighter of the Skala assault unit with the call sign SEM said in an interview that he had joined the assault forces because “you are constantly on the move, always in front, it is a great responsibility, but the result is immediately visible” (his words were reported by a local publication about the stories of the 425th Brigade fighters). Another stormtrooper noted that there is a very high level of brotherhood and mutual support in such units, as everyone’s life depends on the cohesion of a small group.
International partners have also given positive feedback. U.S. and European analysts note that Ukrainians flexibly use the Western equipment provided as part of assault maneuver groups, so that even a limited number of armored vehicles (Bradley, Marder, etc.) have a significant effect on the battlefield. This is confirmed by the data: The 225th Brigade has Bradley BMPs, Marder BMPs, and Kozak armored vehicles, which are actively used in combat operations.
To summarize, the opinions of both Ukrainian and foreign experts coincide: the transition to active defense with the use of assault units has significantly increased the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. Our “assault” fighters have proven in practice that they can turn the tide of battle in their favor, even when formally on the defensive. And their successes – defending supply routes, repelling attacks, destroying elite enemy units – are the best commentary on the feasibility of this approach.
Conclusions and recommendations
The experience of the war of 2022-2025 shows that the creation of specialized assault units and the introduction of the concept of active defense was a justified step. Ukrainian defense operations have greatly benefited from the emergence of a flexible tool on the battlefield – assault groups capable of performing non-standard tasks. The benefits of switching to this approach are obvious: the sustainability of defense has increased, the ability of our troops to disrupt enemy plans has grown, and losses from direct action have decreased. Where we used to have to retreat under pressure, we are now increasingly counterattacking and regaining what we have lost.
To consolidate and build on this success, several recommendations should be implemented:
1. Create a centralized command of assault units. Currently, individual assault regiments (33rd, 225th, 425th, etc.) are subordinated to different brigades or operational commands of the Land Forces. It is advisable to form a single coordination center, for example, the Assault Forces Command (similar to the Airborne Assault Forces Command). This would allow for the development of a unified doctrine, training and logistical standards for all assault units. The Central Command would be able to quickly distribute assault reserves between threatened areas. For example, if an enemy offensive is expected in a certain area of the front, forces from assault units under a single command would be sent there in advance. Such centralization would increase the controllability and effectiveness of these elite forces.
2. Develop the concept of active defense at all levels. It is necessary that the principles that have brought success to the assault troops be implemented on a larger scale, from platoon to brigade. Every commander on the ground should be trained to think about counter-action, not just holding the position. To do so, training programs should include small-group counterattack tactics, coordination with artillery and UAVs for counter-battery and assault support. In fact, active defense should become the official doctrine of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This is also in line with NATO’s approach, where defense always involves a counterattacking reserve. In the Ukrainian context, with limited resources, we have already learned how to use small assault units as effectively as possible, and now we need to scale this experience.
3. Provide assault units with adequate resources and support. Practice shows that to be successful, assault troops need modern equipment (armored vehicles, tanks, light mortars), intelligence (drones, night vision, communications), and a high level of training. The state and the command should prioritize equipping these units with the best available weapons. The example of the 33rd Regiment demonstrates how useful it is to provide assault troops with armored vehicles. Similarly, other assault units should receive Western armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and engineering equipment as a matter of priority. In addition, interaction with artillery and aviation is key to the success of an assault. We need to work out mechanisms for the direct subordination of an artillery battery or attack drone to the commanders of assault groups in a particular operation. This is already being practiced, but it should become the norm.
4. 4. Expand the network of training for attack aircraft. More soldiers and junior commanders should be trained to operate as part of assault units. For this purpose, specialized training centers or courses should be opened (possibly on the basis of existing airborne or Special Forces training centers). Taking into account the experience gained, the training should include assault operations in urban areas, night raids, interaction in groups of 5-10 people, intensive shooting, engineering, and medical training. It is also desirable to adopt the experience of partners, for example, to study the tactics of NATO assault units, Israeli special forces, etc. Rotating instructors with combat experience to training centers will help spread the culture of active defense among recruits more quickly.
5. Integrate assault units into the overall defense structure. This means developing clear mechanisms of interaction between assault regiments and conventional brigades. It should be clear at the level of operation headquarters when and how to engage assault troops. For example, standards should be set: if the enemy breaks through the first line, the assigned assault unit should counterattack within a certain time; if it is necessary to clear a forest belt, an assault group with UAVs should be called in, etc. Such mechanisms are already being developed directly at the front, but they need to be generalized and approved in the form of guidelines or standard procedures. This way, valuable combat experience will not be lost, but will be passed on to other commanders.
To summarize, we can confidently say that active defense with assault units is the way to win a war of attrition. Ukraine has set a precedent when we know how to attack while defending ourselves. The 33rd, 225th, 425th, and other assault regiments have become the “spotted cats” of the Ukrainian army, hunting the enemy by surprise. Their special role in deterring the Russian offensive is obvious – without these units, the enemy would have advanced deeper into our lands long ago. Instead, thanks to the attack aircraft, the map of the front remains almost stable, and in some places we are even advancing. Active defense has already proved its effectiveness, and now it’s time to develop and support it comprehensively. The Ukrainian military has proved the old slogan: “The best defense is an offense,” but an offense that is carefully planned and skillfully executed at the right time. This is exactly how our assault units operate, bringing benefits to the entire Ukrainian defense effort.
The war is on, and active defense is the approach that will allow us to withstand and eventually turn the tide in our favor. By strengthening our assault units, sharing their experience and supporting their morale, we are bringing victory closer. Ukrainian attack aircraft have already made history in this war – now it is time to make them an integral part of our future peaceful history.
Sources: military reports, analytical articles, and official statements of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Leave a Reply