Neutralizing Russia’s Destructive Influence on the Mobilization Process in Ukraine: Retrospective Analysis and the Strategy of Partial Military Service as a Long-Term Solution. Part 1 – 2022
About the organizers (InfoLight.UA Research and Analysis Group)
The history of our team began in May 2022 with a group of volunteers who decided to join the process of helping the Ukrainian state on the information front. In coordination with the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine, we started monitoring social networks in six oblasts of the western region, and since July, we have been systematically monitoring the identified networks throughout Ukraine.
Since October, the initiative has been institutionalized with the support of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Ukraine and has been named the InfoLight.UA Research and Analysis Group.
Since the beginning of its work, the team has been cooperating with the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine and has received several awards. The team uses the most modern tools and techniques, and a large part of the work is done using artificial intelligence tools, including to track malicious Russian narratives. The team has developed its own unique methodologies and cooperates with the best experts and analysts.
The team provided key assistance as a data provider, to which we are extremely grateful.
Since November 2024, the team’s experts have been participating in a closed community for discussing key security issues – the Ukrainian Security Club, which is a platform for coordinating the best experts in their fields. The final stage of the research, which is presented here, was carried out thanks to the organizational support of the Ukrainian Security Club.
Today we are publishing the first part of the article.
An important clarification:
To collect the information that became the basis for the study of Russian influence on the mobilization process, special software based on artificial intelligence was mainly used. The methodology, verification and processing tools are not disclosed in this publication. They are provided to partners in the security and defense sector.
Some of the collected and available materials are not published, but have been transferred to the relevant services of the Security and Defense Sector (and have been transferred since June 2022).
We also note that everything you read below, especially the analysis and conclusions, are our subjective opinions and cannot serve as a basis for defamation charges. Wherever possible, we provide links to information from open sources, and the conclusions we draw may be erroneous.
At the time of publication, these materials were submitted to the relevant government agencies for review and response.
Problems of mobilization
At the beginning of 2025, the situation with mobilization in Ukraine became much more complicated due to high-profile cases of use of force against military personnel and terrorist attacks in the TCC and JFO. The implementation of the Contract 18-24 project, despite its stated goal, is likely to have the exact opposite of the expected consequences.
Several critical factors were not taken into account in the development of this project, which created the basis for strengthening Russia’s destructive influence. First of all, the project was in direct contradiction to the public demand for a fair distribution of the mobilization burden. The problem of the lack of a demobilization mechanism for the military who have been at the front since 2022 has become particularly acute, given that a new category of military has been eligible for demobilization after a year of service. Additional tension was created by a significant difference in the material support of servicemen, including those who are close in age or volunteered before reaching the age of 25.
The current system of mobilization has created a set of interrelated problems that undermine the motivation of potential military personnel. The indefinite nature of military service and the practical impossibility of returning to civilian life, except in cases of serious injury, create a sense of hopelessness. Servicemen effectively drop out of their personal and economic lives for an indefinite period of time, which creates a significant psychological barrier for those who could voluntarily mobilize.
The effect of negative feedback in the mobilization system has become particularly dangerous. Difficult conditions of service and the lack of clear prospects for demobilization reduce the number of volunteers, leading to increased forced mobilization. This, in turn, causes even more resistance in society and further decreases motivation. The situation is exacerbated by a growing sense of injustice among both civilians and soldiers who have been at the front for a long time without rotation.
The situation is particularly acute in small communities, where there has been an increase in both non-violent resistance to mobilization and the use of force. All of this creates a favorable environment for deepening splits in Ukrainian society, which is actively exploited by Russian propaganda.
The existing mobilization system has reached a dead end, where increased coercive measures only worsen the situation. It is becoming clear that a fundamentally new approach is needed to solve the complex problem, which would take into account both the military needs of the state and social realities, in fact, a new social contract on mobilization.
Timeline of disinformation campaigns
Initial phase (spring 2022)
Immediately after the failure of Russia’s plan to take over Ukraine within weeks, the Kremlin began preparing for long-term planning of its operations. One of the elements of this preparation was to create splits in Ukrainian society, including with regard to mobilization.
It is worth noting that preparations for a full-scale invasion were accompanied by similar actions. For example, we can recall how simultaneously there were real protests that are typical for a democratic Ukraine and frankly strange actions, such as the blocking of the center of Kyiv by opponents of vaccination and the march of the “entrepreneurs’ movement” with “demands” to the American embassy. The movement of the so-called “Eurocars”, which started with a different goal but was also infiltrated by Russian influence, was also destructive at the time. However, the corruption of Russian agents in Ukraine probably contributed to their failure.
It is important to emphasize that Russia exerted destructive influence through organizers and provocateurs, probably using some of the leaders of these movements “in the dark.” It would be a mistake to consider all participants as paid agents of Russia or ideological enemies of Ukraine. There was a practice of paid participation in public events in Ukraine, so some of the participants could have been involved in this way.
Starting in April-May 2022, Russia launched a large-scale campaign in the information space. Many different narratives were launched at once, probably to test which ones would resonate. Among the main ones were “everyone was thrown for meat”, “naked and barefooted ladybugs”, “volunteer help was stolen”, and “disabled people are being mobilized”. At that time, it was the creation of a parallel reality against the backdrop of real queues of volunteers at the CCC.
Telegram channels played a special role even then, informing about the places of distribution of summonses, although there was no military mobilization at that time, and the punishment for failure to appear was symbolic. Our investigation, including spot checks, showed that a significant part of the messages were fake. Even when our volunteers sent deliberately false messages in the absence of the military in the specified locations, these messages were instantly published without verification.
However, it was these channels that began to form the attitude that the issuance of summonses poses a threat to Ukrainians! In April 2022, Russia began systematic work with these channels, which in 2024 ended with organized communities throughout Ukraine!
For example, the Telegram channel“Where summonses are issued – Lviv”with an admin account @Sage_Lviv. Monitoring of this channel in June 2022 allowed us to identify potential administrators through their careless posts, including “volunteer assistance reports” with identifying details. Similar channels operated throughout Ukraine, creating an atmosphere of fear around the summonses, presenting them as a “ticket to certain death” using both Telegram and Viber.
The main sources of disinformation were several key individuals whose materials were massively replicated through various channels. Some posts received up to 100,000 reposts, and videos received millions of views. A characteristic feature was the cover of information activities by volunteering and the constant change of accounts, which made it difficult to track (which is why it is almost impossible to find traces of these activities in 2025).
The following main narratives were promoted in the first half of 2022: – Most crimes in the western region of Ukraine are committed by IDPs – Territorial defense units are completely unsupplied, have poor command, and are sent to the front line as cannon fodder – Command of military units is incompetent, resulting in significant losses, which leads to significant losses – Shortage of basic goods (e.g. salt) – Forgetting Azov soldiers from Azovstal – Concealment of information about missing soldiers – Non-payment of salaries to the military – Opposition of locals and newcomers
It is important to understand that the issue of the Azovstal soldiers will be used by Russia constantly, and the enemy will repeatedly use the understandable desire of the families of the heroes to bring their loved ones home to put pressure on Ukraine and demoralize the Ukrainian military and their families.
It is noteworthy that even some bloggers previously associated with Petro Poroshenko, such as Roman Revedzhuk and Myroslav Oleshko, joined the opposition to mobilization. Since the anti-mobilization rhetoric was incompatible with the political position of the former President, these bloggers entered into a sharp public conflict with their former associates.
The key conclusion is that it was in the period from April to June 2022 that the basis for systemic counteraction to mobilization in Ukraine was laid. Since this campaign was not planned in advance for Russia (they expected to “take Kyiv in three days”), they initially actively used agents of influence previously embedded in the movements of anti-vaccinationists and entrepreneurs. Subsequently, some of these agents continued their activities, some went into hiding, and some left Ukraine and are now conducting propaganda from there.
Deployment (mid-2022)
In the middle of summer 2022, Russia, having analyzed the results of the test narratives of the initial phase, found the first sensitive points for increasing influence. The main focus was the topic of Ukrainian prisoners and pressure on their families. Despite the fact that the issue of exchanges was resolved quite successfully for the conditions of a full-scale war, Russia put intense pressure on the families of those who remained in captivity. The terrorist attack in Olenivka was used in a particularly cynical manner.
These manipulations led to an attempt to organize the first “mini-Maidan” on August 21, 2022, which was promptly stopped. The organizer of the action, Oleksiy Osker, was arrested, albeit briefly.
At that time, the first mistakes of the Ukrainian authorities began, in particular, the issuance of summonses to curfew violators, participants in street fights, etc. The image of the summons as a punishment would begin to play a very negative role over time.
It is also difficult to explain the appropriateness of, for example, handing out summonses near churches on major Christian holidays. And while the news from Rivne of April 2022 may be disinformation, Mykola Kniazhytskyi’s post of July of the same year caused a scandal.
It is important to note the technological component of the campaign. Although Telegram was rapidly gaining popularity as a source of information, TikTok became the main platform for creating malicious narratives. It was there that original videos were published, which were then distributed to other social networks. Especially popular was the distribution of such videos through groups of esoteric and conspiracy theorists.
At the same time, “human rights activists” also entered the arena, giving public advice on “behavior with TCC employees.” Even then, there were isolated narratives about the illegality of the war and mobilization, and some lawyers were campaigning to ignore the border guards and leave Ukraine, claiming that there were no legal restrictions. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian media gave them a platform, even inviting them to participate in a single telethon.
In parallel with the telegram channels mentioned in the previous section, the following began to form closed communities on Viberthat accumulated all those who fell victim to propaganda. It was Viber, not Telegram, that became the main messenger for coordinating counter-mobilization and remains so to this day.
At the same time, the first corruption cases in the MCC began to be publicized, and prices and methods of evading mobilization were spread on social media. Probably, this was the key moment when corrupt officials in the TCC felt impunity and lack of control over their lifestyle. Many of these stories were made up.
An important element of the campaign was the use of “investigative bloggers” by pro-Russian forces, such as Ostap Stakhiv, who actively promoted the story of Serhiy Galchenko, a deserter from the 24th Separate Mechanized Brigade. The latter spread false stories about “inhumane conditions at the Yavoriv training ground,” claiming that “out of 30 people in the platoon, 5 got pneumonia.” His narratives clearly echoed Russian propaganda about “betrayal” and “bad Ukrainian commanders of the highest level.”
At first glance, it seemed that the different actors (Osker, Stakhiv, Gura, and others) acted independently. However, the analysis revealed the existence of a coordinated network for the distribution of their content, which ensured the massive reach of their videos, posts and narratives. Tracking was complicated by the frequent blocking of their profiles and the practice of publishing videos through empty accounts.
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