Neutralizing Russia’s Destructive Influence on the Mobilization Process in Ukraine: Retrospective Analysis and the Strategy of Partial Military Service as a Long-Term Solution. Part 4 – 2024

The fourth part of our research “Neutralizing Russia’s destructive influence on the mobilization process in Ukraine: retrospective analysis and the strategy of partial military service as a long-term solution”. The first part is available at this linkand the second part is available at this linkand the third part is available here.

An important clarification:

• To collect the information that became the basis for the study of Russian influence on the mobilization process, special software based on artificial intelligence was mainly used. The methodology, verification and processing tools are not disclosed in this publication. They are provided to partners in the security and defense sector.
• Some of the collected and available materials are not published, but have been transferred to the relevant services of the Security and Defense Sector (and have been transferred since June 2022).
• We also note that everything you read below, especially the analysis and conclusions, are our subjective opinions and cannot serve as a basis for defamation charges. Wherever possible, we provide links to information from open sources, and the conclusions we draw may be erroneous.
• At the time of publication, these materials were submitted to the relevant government agencies for review and response.

Transition to real violence (early 2025)

The period is characterized by the completion of the narrative of “people’s avengers” and the spread of the idea that Ukraine’s defeat was inevitable. The narrative that refusal to mobilize is not only legal but also morally justified began to dominate society.

The previously mentioned cases of the use of cold steel against TCC employees were no longer exceptional events. Whereas in 2024 such incidents were accompanied by public condemnation, in early 2025 they were increasingly described on social media as “just retribution.”

We can recall the resonant case of October 2024, when the threat of punishment and retaliatory shots did not stop people from taking aggressive actions.

It is worth paying attention to the rather lenient punishments, which are obviously not in line with the conditions of war and threats.

InfoLight.UA’s warnings about the transition from provocations of the use of force against civilians to attacks on the military and military facilities were realized. The influence on the minds of some Ukrainians has crossed the line that previously deterred them from radical actions.

A separate problem was the activity of organizers of resistance to mobilization. Due to corruption in the judicial system and imperfect legislation, virtually none of the detained leaders of anti-mobilization communities remained in custody – all were released and continued their activities. This impunity was perceived by their supporters as proof of their case.

Due to the implementation of the Contract 18-24 project, a significant increase in destructive Russian influence is expected from February 11, 2025. Despite its stated purpose, the project contradicts the public demand for a fair distribution of the mobilization burden. The lack of a demobilization mechanism for soldiers who have been at the front since 2022 has become particularly acute, especially since a new category of soldiers has been granted the right to demobilize after a year of service.

The mobilization has obviously reached a dead end and requires non-linear solutions, as the increase in coercive measures only worsens the situation and creates new risks to state security.

Research on motivations for mobilization

Given the developments described in the previous sections, the InfoLight.UA Research and Analysis Group , together with its partners, conducted a comprehensive study of Ukrainians’ motivations for mobilization. Two waves of the survey were conducted, in November-December 2024 and in January-February 2025. The survey was conducted, taking into account the existence of a by Oleksandr Ivanov concept of partial military service.

The methodology was developed in such a way as to first investigate the motivations of the main target groups, then describe several solution options through assumptions and mathematical modeling, and finally test which one is optimal. At the final stage, it was planned to conduct a sociological survey to confirm or refute the assumptions.

The first stage. Research of motivations.

Two studies were conducted in Ukraine with the support of the Hanns Seidel Foundation:

• Research on the Impact of Disinformation and Organized Information and Psychological Operations on Ukrainian Refugee Men
• Research on the Impact of Disinformation on Ukrainian Men in the Context of Mobilization

After the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops on February 24, 2022, society faced unprecedented challenges: a war of attrition, mass migration, demographic threats, and disinformation crises artificially created by Russian propaganda. The impact of these factors on mobilization processes and the resilience of Ukrainian society requires special attention.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, was not considered by the aggressor to be a long-term operation. Accordingly, at its beginning, Russia accumulated precisely the resources that it planned to spend during the so-called “special military operation” (SMO). However, the aggressor underestimated Ukraine’s ability to resist and the support of the international community. Russia also did not prepare special information operations aimed at long-term exhaustion of Ukraine.

At the initial stage of the war, in February-April 2022, information and psychological operations (IPO) were aimed at demoralizing, forcing surrender, and creating panic among the population and the military. These aspects are described in more detail in the report of the InfoLight.UA Research and Analysis Group“Russian Expansion Machine:Doctrinal, Information and Foreign Policy Aspects“.

The methodological basis of the study was formed taking into account the unprecedented conditions of a full-scale war and the need to study complex social and psychological processes in Ukrainian society. Particular attention was paid to developing tools to study the impact of disinformation on Ukrainian citizens who were forced to leave the country.
The study was conducted in the context of active information confrontation and constant attempts by the enemy to influence public opinion through various communication channels. This required an integrated approach to data collection and analysis, as well as the development of specific methods for verifying the information received.

An important aspect of the methodology was to take into account the psychological state of respondents who are affected by the traumatic experience of war and forced displacement. This required a particularly delicate approach to conducting surveys and interviews, as well as the development of special methods for dealing with sensitive topics.

The research methodology was based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, which allowed us to obtain both statistically significant data and an in-depth understanding of the motivations and fears of respondents. Particular attention was paid to studying the impact of various information sources on the formation of public opinion and decision-making on returning to Ukraine.

The study actively used modern technological solutions to monitor the information space, which allowed us to track and analyze disinformation campaigns in real time. This made it possible not only to record the facts of information attacks but also to study their impact on target audiences.

The main purpose of the study was to investigate:

• Experience, motivations and barriers of Ukrainian citizens to mobilization.
• Factors that influence the decision of refugees and men who stayed in the country to participate in the defense of Ukraine.
• The impact of information and psychological operations on the attitude of citizens to mobilization.
• Identify the main problems that hinder mobilization and possible ways to overcome them.
  

This study does not claim to be a representative sample due to the difficult conditions of data collection in a time of war, in particular due to the significant migration of citizens. The lack of accurate registration data makes it difficult to form a reliable sample. Nevertheless, the results of the study correlate with most similar studies and allow us to consider it relevant. In total, we conducted 100 in-depth personal interviews (50 in the first stage and 50 in the second) and received 190 detailed questionnaires.

To establish trust (among those who avoided mobilization), we held an interim presentation of the results, after which we came out with the survey again.

We would like to emphasize that we are faithfully fulfilling our promise not to provide anyone (including the state authorities) with detailed results of the surveys and questionnaires we conducted among refugees and those who avoid mobilization. We publish the results only in a statically processed form.

Men abroad:

• Geography: The main countries of residence are Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, the USA, and Canada.
• Selection method: Targeted online surveys through social media, cooperation with Ukrainian diaspora organizations.

Men in Ukraine:

• Characteristics: Men aged 18-60, including military personnel, reservists and those who evade mobilization.
• Selection method: The sample was formed through social networks, closed groups and communities discussing mobilization issues.

The main questions we asked were as follows:

1. Why are you not ready to join the ranks of the Ukrainian Defense Forces?

Below, we present answers separately for refugee men, those who avoided mobilization, and general answers for the two waves of the survey.

2. What could motivate you to decide to join the ranks of the Ukrainian Defense Forces?

3. What do you consider to be the main obstacles to effective mobilization in Ukraine?

4. Name the three main reforms that the state should implement to improve the situation with mobilization

The study revealed significant differences in attitudes toward mobilization among different categories of Ukrainian citizens. The results of the survey of three groups were particularly revealing: refugees, those who avoid mobilization, and the general sample of Ukrainians. The results of the survey also revealed a complex picture of the interaction of various factors that influence the decision-making of Ukrainian citizens regarding mobilization and return to Ukraine. The impact of targeted disinformation campaigns on the formation of public opinion and individual decisions was particularly noticeable.

Ukrainians living abroad demonstrate the highest level of concern for personal safety – two-thirds of refugees surveyed fear imminent death at the front. They are also the most concerned about the fairness of the mobilization system and the uncertainty of the terms of service. At the same time, this group proved to be the most sensitive to the prospect of Ukraine’s membership in NATO as a motivating factor. Refugees especially emphasize the importance of communication with the state and the need for systemic reforms in the army.

The qualitative analysis of the in-depth interviews revealed a complex structure of motivations and fears that influence decision-making. The impact of the refugees’ emotional isolation and their sense of detachment from events in Ukraine was particularly noticeable. At the same time, the successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine remain a key motivational factor that can contribute to the return of citizens and their readiness to participate in the defense of the country.

The study revealed the systemic nature of Russian information and psychological operations aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining its ability to resist. These operations are characterized by a high level of coordination and the use of a wide range of communication channels.

This is especially evident in the results of the survey of citizens who deliberately avoid mobilization. Their responses show that they are most sensitive to the problem of corruption – more than three-quarters of respondents indicated this as a critical obstacle. They also express serious concerns about the risk of death or disability and the problems of material support for the troops. This group also showed the highest support for the idea of creating special brigades of MPs and high-ranking officials, and demonstrated a strong demand for reforming the system of territorial recruitment centers. Personal interviews revealed the details of these fears and motivations, which are mainly related to the distrust of the state and its representatives that arose as a result of Russia’s destructive influence on the mobilization process in Ukraine.

The overall sample of Ukrainians showed more moderate positions on most issues. The main problems they see are the unfairness of the current mobilization system, corruption and uncertainty of service terms. At the same time, their vision of the necessary reforms was more balanced, with an emphasis on systemic changes rather than radical transformations.

The study revealed several unexpected trends. In particular, all groups showed low interest in technological solutions and digitalization of mobilization processes. The issue of increasing financial support is also not seen as a significant motivator.

Instead, the quality of command is a concern for representatives of all surveyed categories.
What is particularly noteworthy is that despite their different views on certain aspects, all groups are united in their demand for fairness, transparency and predictability of the mobilization process. This points to the need for a comprehensive approach to reforming the system that would take into account the specific needs and concerns of different categories of persons liable for military service.

The study also shows the importance of a differentiated approach to communication with different groups. While international guarantees and clear state policy are important for refugees, internal reforms and fighting corruption are critical for those who avoid mobilization. Taking these features into account may be the key to improving the effectiveness of mobilization processes in Ukraine.

A detailed analysis of the responses allowed us to formulate three assumptions about possible reforms that could change the attitude of Ukrainians towards mobilization, namely

If you were offered to join the Ukrainian Defense Forces on the condition that out of 60 days in the Armed Forces, you would have 10 days to rest, including 10 days to visit your relatives, 10 days to intensify training in your military specialty, and 40 days to participate in combat operations, would this change your attitude to mobilization?

Would you agree to be voluntarily mobilized for military service combined with civilian life? 3 months of service followed by 6 months of civilian life with full reservation from mobilization during civilian life?

Would you agree to be voluntarily mobilized to the Ukrainian Defense Forces, provided that the state guarantees an adaptation period for non-combat positions in the rear or in the border areas with Belarus?

The second stage. A sociological survey.

A study was conducted to find out which of these reforms could be supported. It was conducted by Active Group with the help of the SunFlower Sociology online panel . Method: Self-completion of questionnaires by Ukrainian citizens aged 18 and older. Sample: 1200 questionnaires (representative by age, gender and region of Ukraine). Data collection period: January 2025.

The following answers were received:

• More than a third of Ukrainian citizens have expressed their readiness to voluntarily mobilize for military service if a model is introduced that allows for the combination of service and civilian life: three months of service for six months of civilian life with full reservation during the civilian period. These are the findings of a sociological survey conducted by Active Group in January 2025 using the SunFlower Sociology online panel.
• In particular, 7.8% of respondents said they would “definitely mobilize” under such conditions, and another 26.4% said they would “rather mobilize.” At the same time, 22.0% stated that they “would not mobilize under any circumstances,” and 25.3% were not able to give a definite answer.
  Regarding the topic of the adaptation period in rear or border positions, 30.8% of respondents expressed their readiness to voluntarily mobilize under such conditions. Of these, 7.7% would “definitely mobilize” and 23.2% would “rather mobilize”. However, 21.7% stated a categorical refusal, and 27.2% were undecided.
• Another question concerned the attitude to mobilization in the case of the proposed distribution of time in the army: 40 days of participation in combat operations, 10 days of rest and 10 days of intensive training in a military specialty. Under this model, 22.0% of respondents expressed their readiness for voluntary mobilization (4.2% – “definitely”, 17.8% – “would rather mobilize”). At the same time, 27.9% stated that they “would not mobilize under any circumstances,” and 29.4% hesitated to answer.

The reform project was based on the results of this survey, previous research and analysis of factors and fears that could be changed. The result is the concept of partial military service.

Proposed solution: a strategy for partial military service

The introduction of a system of partial military service can attract from 300 to 800 thousand volunteers, according to the results of a comprehensive study of Ukraine’s mobilization potential and the reform of the mobilization system in Ukraine, presented by the InfoLight.UA Research and Analytical Group in cooperation with experts from the Ukrainian Security Club. The founder of Active Group, Andriy Yeremenko, explained that a study conducted by his company showed that 34.2% of Ukrainians are ready to be voluntarily mobilized if a model of partial military service is introduced. Of these, 7.8% of respondents said they would “definitely mobilize,” and 26.4% said they would “rather mobilize.”

We explain the main principles of the reform in detail.

Problems of mobilization

The problem of mobilization in Ukraine is very acute. Significant factors of reluctance to mobilize are the fact that military service is now indefinite, and the inability to return to civilian life, except in case of a serious injury. A sense of uncertainty, distrust of the command, a sense of hopelessness due to the impossibility of demobilization, and loss of personal and economic life all contribute to the reluctance to mobilize. As a result, we have social tension in society due to forced mobilization, a sense of injustice among the military who are fighting indefinitely, while most fit men are not. We also have a sense of fatigue among the military due to the lack of rotations, normal rest and the possibility of demobilization.

There is a negative feedback between the complexity of military service and mobilization: the more difficult the service, the harder it is to find people who are ready to mobilize voluntarily. The more difficult it is to mobilize new people, the more difficult the service becomes for the military. With the current approach of forced mobilization, it is impossible to break this negative feedback loop. The more aggressive the forced mobilization, the greater the resistance of society. To fix this, we need a new approach, new rules of the game, and a new social contract.

Game theory

But before we move on to proposing a new strategy for military service, we need to understand why the current mobilization is not working. Mathematical game theory can help. Game theory is a branch of mathematics that models the behavior of subjects (players) when the decision criterion of each depends on the decisions made by others. Game theory is used in modeling strategic decisions, wars, international politics, economics, etc. In the case of mobilization modeling, the mathematical apparatus of game theory allows us to find optimal strategies for the state and citizens. In modeling mobilization with the help of game theory, we consider the strategies of the citizen and the state.

• Citizen strategies are: 1) voluntary mobilization and 2) evasion of mobilization.
• State strategies: 1) forced mobilization and 2) recruitment.

If we assume that the probability of forced mobilization is less than 100% (and in practice it is much less), then using game theory, we can formally prove that the optimal strategy for a citizen is to avoid mobilization, and for the state – to force mobilization. This is the so-called Nash equilibrium, when none of the players can change their strategy profitably on their own (John Nash is an American mathematician and one of the founders of game theory).

The strategy of partial military service.

It is proposed to mobilize citizens for a partial period of time without separation from civilian life. That is, a serviceman serves for a certain period of time and returns to full civilian life for the rest of the time. For example, 6 months of military service followed by 12 months of civilian life, or 3 months of service followed by 6 months of civilian life. After the period of civilian life, if martial law is still in effect, the citizen returns to military service, and so on in a circle. The parameter of service time and the ratio should be chosen experimentally. The key to this strategy is the transition of society to a civil-military state of life and the ability to be flexible. At the same time, the strategy of partial military service should include a system of coercion: if a citizen does not mobilize voluntarily (or does not join the queue for voluntary mobilization for partial military service), then he or she can be mobilized forcibly, but for permanent military service, for example, for 2-3 years.

If this strategy is solved using game theory, then the optimal Nash strategy for a citizen is voluntary mobilization, and for the state – forced mobilization and recruitment in a certain ratio.

Such a Nash equilibrium exists if (share of military service) < (probability of forced mobilization) * (time of forced service). For example, if a citizen serves in partial military service for 6 months and lives a civilian life for 12 months. Then the share of military service will be 1/3.

If a citizen evades military service and the probability of forced mobilization is 20% (1 out of 5 evaders will be forcibly mobilized), and the time of forced military service is 2 years. Then, on average, such citizens will serve 0.2 * 2 = 0.4. 1/3 < 0.4, so it is on average more profitable for citizens to voluntarily mobilize than to evade military service.

Implementation details

According to the strategy of partial military service, citizens who have been voluntarily mobilized serve for a certain part of a certain period (for example, 25-30%), and live a civilian life for the rest of the period. For example, 6 months of military service for 12 months of civilian life. Or 3 months of military service for 6 months of civilian life. The time of military service and the ratio between military service and civilian life should be carefully selected and requires further consultation with the military and political leadership of the state and additional mathematical modeling.

• Citizens who evade military service can be forcibly mobilized for a long time (2-3 years).
• Citizens who serve under the partial mobilization scheme cannot be forcibly mobilized for full time.
• After voluntary mobilization, servicemen undergo CPE, training under the LOA, and unit cohesion. Citizens can also receive basic training at TRO training centers as part of the Citizens’ Training for National Resistance Program.
• Rotation should be carried out by units (for example, companies), not individually.
• A national system of military service queues may be introduced. Citizens will enlist in their own units and rotate in turns (1st, 2nd, etc.). This will provide predictability for citizens, the Ukrainian defense forces, and businesses.
• Differentiated service time to civilian life can be introduced. For example, infantry 1 month to 5 months of civilian life (or 1 to 10), drone operators 1 to 4, rear 1 to 2, etc.
• Differentiated financial support, depending on the percentage of time a person serves. For example, a serviceman who serves 25% of the time in a month receives 50% of the base salary for the month, and one who serves 100% of the time receives 150% of the base salary
• Adaptation of military personnel to war (gradual introduction to combat operations). Military personnel can first be deployed to safe areas of the frontline – protecting the northern border, guarding military units, equipping the 2nd and 3rd lines of defense – and then eventually be involved in the war on the 1st line of defense.

It is important to note that the defense forces need a large core (200-300 thousand servicemen) of professional contract soldiers for whom military service will be a profession. And a significant part of the army (for example, 1.5 million) can be rotated under the scheme of partial military service during martial law.

Experiment

Partial mobilization can be launched as an experiment in 1-2 brigades. The brigades will select volunteers based on their skills and motivation. It will be necessary to study the response of citizens to partial mobilization, the difficulties of implementing and maintaining it, etc. Based on the experiment, if the results are successful, it can be gradually scaled up to the entire Ukrainian Defense Forces.

Existing examples

The rotation in brigades or battalions is an example of partial mobilization, but during the rotation, the soldiers actually do little useful work, mostly just stay on the permanent duty station.

Some brigades have also customized their service schedule: 3 weeks of service, 1-2 weeks of vacation.
Rotation of volunteers in Aerial Reconnaissance, Hospitallers, Barakuda

Advantages.

• A new fair social contract, under which almost everyone serves in the defense forces.
• It is potentially possible to attract a much larger number of people to the defense forces than at present.
• Citizens who serve under the partial mobilization scheme hardly drop out of the country’s economic life. Businesses can adapt by planning for the absence of employees and rotating them.
• Citizens will not drop out of their personal and family lives and will be able to raise their children. This will also reduce social tension among military personnel.
• Under this scheme, it will be possible to gradually transfer servicemen who have been fighting for years to partial mobilization, and later to a longer rest.
• A sense of justice and solidarity will be restored in society.
• Acclimatization of servicemen: with partial mobilization, most people will be able to see that joining the defense forces is not a guaranteed death on the second day. They will be able to feel more confident and serve more than 25% of the time.
• It is possible to cancel economic reservations and thus increase the number of men who can be mobilized.
• With partial mobilization, citizens will have an incentive to learn how to fight and improve their skills in their free time when they are not on duty.
• Direct recruitment of military units for partial mobilization.
• Return of military personnel from the NW Ukraine.
• There may be a partial return of Ukrainian men from abroad due to the certainty of mobilization.
• The ability of Ukraine to attract significantly more resources for defense than it currently has will potentially allow Ukraine to stabilize the front and strengthen its negotiating position.
• Forced mobilization and the lack of rotation of servicemen as it is now may also affect the mobilization potential for the future. If there is a ceasefire for a long time (e.g., several years), many men of conscription age may go abroad in anticipation of a possible new phase of the war and new mobilization without the possibility of rotation. In the case of a partial mobilization strategy, there may be a smaller outflow of men from the country.

Disadvantages

– The complexity of organizing the process of partial mobilization
– The need to amend the legislation
– Unwillingness to partially mobilize to dangerous areas of the frontline. It will be necessary to select the percentage of time spent on duty and other bonuses for performing dangerous service.
– It will be necessary to develop a mechanism for transferring military personnel between military units and branches of the military.
– Complexity and increased danger of rotation
– To transfer all or at least most of the defense forces (1 million) to partial mobilization, it is necessary to attract another 3 million to partial mobilization. In fact, we are talking about the need for all able-bodied men to be involved in the defense forces in one way or another.

Conclusions.

The problem of mobilization in Ukraine can be viewed from the perspective of game theory. Game theory predicts that under the conditions of classical compulsory mobilization until the end of a special period, which occurs randomly with a certain low probability, the optimal strategy of a citizen is to evade mobilization, and the optimal strategy of the state is to compel mobilization. Another solution, besides mobilization for continuous military service, is the strategy of partial military service. In this scenario, there are strategies that will lead to the fact that the optimal strategy for a citizen will always be voluntary mobilization. The strategy of partial military service offers a new fair social contract and can potentially solve the problems of manning the Ukrainian army, stabilizing the frontline, and strengthening Ukraine’s internal and external resilience.

Conclusions and recommendations

The study demonstrates that the current system of mobilization in Ukraine requires fundamental changes. The game theory analysis revealed a fundamental problem with the current approach – it creates a situation where evasion of mobilization becomes a rational choice for citizens, and the state is forced to increase coercive measures, which only exacerbates the confrontation.

The proposed strategy of partial military service offers a fundamentally new social contract. Its effectiveness is confirmed by both theoretical calculations and the results of sociological research. More than a third of Ukrainians have expressed their willingness to voluntarily join this form of service, which could attract between 300 and 800 thousand volunteers.

Implementing the new strategy requires a phased approach. First, it is necessary to conduct a pilot project in several brigades, which will allow us to work out the mechanisms of interaction and identify potential problems. At the same time, appropriate legislative changes should be developed and adopted to enshrine the status of partial military service and establish clear rights and obligations for all participants.

An important element of the reform should be the creation of a flexible system that takes into account the specifics of different branches of the military. This includes different ratios of service time to civilian life, differentiated salaries, and adapted training programs. A national system of military service queues would provide predictability for both citizens and businesses.

Particular attention should be paid to the gradual transition of active military personnel to the new system, giving priority to those who have been at the front for the longest time. This will help reduce accumulated fatigue and restore fairness in the distribution of military workload.

Successful implementation of the partial military service strategy could have far-reaching consequences for Ukraine. In addition to directly enhancing defense capabilities by increasing the number of personnel, it will preserve the country’s economic potential, reduce social tensions, and strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position. In the long run, such a system would ensure the sustainability of the country’s defense potential by creating a large reserve of trained military personnel who maintain constant contact with the armed forces.

Автор: Редактор