Special investigation, the first part of the analytical study “How pro-Russian politicians use TikTok. Ukrainian realities and the “explosion” in Romania” by the Research and Analysis Group InfoLight.UA in cooperation with the Information Center “Intermarium” and the Center for Security and Development.
TikTok is no longer just a platform for entertainment. Over the past year, this social network has become a powerful tool of political influence in Eastern Europe, as demonstrated by the presidential campaign in Romania. The stunning success of the pro-Russian candidate, Kelin Georgescu, who unexpectedly won the first round of elections, made experts and intelligence agencies in many countries pay close attention to the mechanisms of influence through this platform.
Our study is the result of a long-term monitoring and analysis of the activities of pro-Russian political forces on TikTok in Ukraine and neighboring countries. We relied on a wide range of sources, from Romanian and international media to data from the TikTok Creative Center platform. A special role in the study was played by the Osavul Malicious Information Narrative Tracking Platform, which allowed us to track the dynamics of the spread of key messages.
In the first part of our study, we will take a closer look at the technology that ensured the unexpected success of the pro-Russian candidate in Romania. The second part will analyze how similar mechanisms are used in Ukraine to undermine the country’s defense efforts.
We will see how a seemingly simple scheme turned out to be surprisingly effective in the Romanian context, and why this should serve as a serious warning for Ukraine. We will pay special attention to the systematic use of TikTok to discredit mobilization efforts and spread pro-Russian narratives among the youth audience.
Romanian electoral shock: political consequences of the unexpected victory
On November 24, 2024, Romania experienced what experts called “the biggest electoral earthquake in the country’s post-communist history.” Kelin Georgescu, a 62-year-old university professor with openly pro-Russian views, unexpectedly won the first round of the presidential election with 22.9% of the vote.
Just a week before the election, Georgescu’s approval rating barely reached 5%. His victory came as a shock to the political establishment – among 13 candidates, he beat all the favorites, including the current prime minister.
On the eve of the vote, experts’ attention was focused on another far-right figure. Opinion polls showed that George Simion, the leader of the far-right Alliance for Romanian Unity (AUR), would come in second or even first. Analysts expected Simion, an active supporter of US President-elect Donald Trump, to face Prime Minister Ciolacu in the second round. Simion favors the accession of Moldova, which this year renewed a five-year ban on his entry to the country for security reasons, and for the same reason he is banned from neighboring Ukraine.
A former member of the AUR, Georgescu left the party in 2022 for being too pro-Russian. He has openly criticized NATO, calling the missile defense system in Deveselu a “disgrace to diplomacy” and claiming that the alliance would not protect its members in the event of a Russian attack. In an interview, he questioned the very fact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Georgescu has also publicly glorified Ion Antonescu, a Romanian dictator during World War II who was executed for his participation in the Holocaust, and Corneliu Zel Codreanu, the leader of the fascist Iron Guard.
Interestingly, Georgescu said on the podcast that Pepsi “contains microchips and gets inside you like a laptop”. On the other hand, he was a Freemason. The document shows his participation in the “lighting of the fires,” the first important event of the National Grand Lodge of Romania, the Tower of the Council notes.
Experts attribute the success of Georgescu to the deep disappointment of voters in the current government, the highest inflation rate in the EU, and the largest share of the population at risk of poverty. “There was an expectation, a desire for a revenge vote, a protest vote, on the part of people with many frustrations, with rebellion, with anger towards the system,” explains international relations expert Valentin Naumescu.
The key to success was an unprecedented campaign on TikTok. Social media bombarded voters with messages that Bohdan was a “true Romanian” and a “strong leader” who had a “plan” and “solutions.” The campaign focused on reducing Romania’s dependence on food and energy imports, ending aid to Ukraine, and criticizing NATO. Significantly, Georgescu’s anti-Western messages were regularly picked up by Russian state media and pro-Russian social media.
“Tonight, the Romanian people called for peace. And they shouted very loudly, extremely loudly”said Georgescu after the results were announced, calling his victory an “extraordinary awakening” of the people.
Reaction in Romania: from shock to investigation
The unprecedented victory of Kelin Georgescu in the first round of the presidential election triggered an equally unprecedented reaction from Romanian state authorities. For the first time in the country’s history, several key institutions simultaneously launched investigations into the circumstances of the election campaign.
The rapid growth of support for the candidate – from 5% a week before the election to 22.9% on election day – is unprecedented in Romania’s democratic history. This fact has caused special attention from government agencies.
The country’s Constitutional Court initiated a full recount. At the same time, the National Audiovisual Council asked the European Commission to investigate the role of the TikTok platform in the electoral process. The most radical position was taken by the deputy head of the telecommunications regulator ANCOM, who demanded a temporary blocking of the social network until the investigation is completed.
“We believed that TikTok was misused and was triggered by its inappropriate use and the army of fake accounts that were used for its purposes,” explains Bogdan Manolea, executive director of the Romanian Association for Technology and the Internet. According to him, the platform should have noticed the “wave of thousands of fake accounts” and should be held accountable under the European Digital Services Act (DSA).
Kate Keeley, coordinator of the Bulgarian-Romanian Digital Media Observatory, notes that although political advertising is formally prohibited by TikTok’s rules, this restriction was “largely ineffective” in the case of the Georgescu campaign.
The victory of the pro-Russian candidate also provoked a strong public reaction. Thousands of young people took to the streets of Bucharest to protest against a possible change in the country’s foreign policy. The protesters accused the Georgescu campaign of using bots to artificially promote content and expressed fears of foreign interference in the election process.
International reaction: from concern to alarm
The unexpected victory of a pro-Russian candidate in Romania has caused serious concern among the international community. Of particular concern is the country’s strategic location-Romania shares a 400-mile border with Ukraine, hosts an important NATO military base, and provides a critical transit route for Ukrainian grain and Western weapons.
Until now, Bucharest has been a reliable, albeit not very visible, ally of Ukraine. It was Romania that repeatedly helped solve logistical problems when difficulties arose on the borders with Poland, Hungary, or Slovakia.
“Never in 34 years of democracy have we seen such a surge in the polls,” – said political analyst Radu Magdin, emphasizing the unprecedented nature of the situation.
The European Parliament responded by demanding that TikTok’s management be summoned to explain itself. “We call on the CEO of TikTok to come to address this house and make sure that his platform does not violate the DSA,”said Valerie Heyer, head of the liberal group Renew Europe.
“Romania is a wake-up call: radicalization and disinformation can happen all over Europe with harmful consequences,”added Heyer, an ally of French President Emmanuel Macron. It is worth noting that this is not the first time TikTok has been criticized in the EU. In 2023, Macron himself called the platform “deceptively innocent” and the cause of “real addiction” among users.
TikTok denies the allegations. “These highly speculative reports about the Romanian elections are inaccurate and misleading, as most candidates have established a presence on TikTok and the winners campaigned on other digital platforms,”said Paolo Ganino, the company’s representative. According to him, the platform has set up a special election center to provide verified information and is working with local organizations to counter disinformation.
Experts warn that the situation in Romania could have serious consequences for the entire region. The rise of pro-Russian sentiment in the EU and NATO member state poses risks to the unity of the West’s position and could jeopardize further support for Ukraine.
The use of Christian rhetoric: the church factor of victory
The unexpected success of Kelin Georgescu is largely due to the skillful use of the religious factor in the election campaign. A key role in this was played by the decision of the Romanian Orthodox Church of February 29, 2024, which recommended that the faithful choose candidates according to ten criteria, including “manifestation of faith in God,” “promotion of the traditional family,” and “implementation of anti-abortion policies.”
Although these criteria had existed since 2008 and were regularly published before each election, it was Georgescu who managed to use them effectively in his campaign. He positioned himself as a candidate who met all the church’s requirements, emphasizing the protection of the interests of the Romanian people “with dignity,” the preservation of natural resources, and the promotion of traditional values.
The situation became even more complicated when a pseudo-communique began circulating on social media, using official church criteria to support a particular candidate. “In order to appear as truthful as possible, the author used these criteria, adding a sentence at the end that is easily misleading and seems to favor a particular candidate,”explained Adrian Agachi, spokesman for the Patriarchate.
Despite the official statements of the church leadership about neutrality, the Romanian media reported massive campaigning by priests and monks in favor of Gorgescu. The patriarchate admitted that it had no direct mechanisms to influence such activities, as only territorial church units can impose sanctions according to the church charter.
German expert on Romania Katja Plate explains this situation by an internal split in the church hierarchy: “It is well known that some bishops have strong pro-Russian tendencies and are agitating for the unification of the efforts of the Orthodox brotherly countries of Romania and Russia on the basis of the community of Orthodox churches. While Patriarch Daniel has repeatedly demonstrated a pro-European stance, this is far from the case with the Synod, the church’s governing body.”
Thus, the religious factor became one of the key elements of Georgescu’s unexpected success, allowing him not only to mobilize the traditional electorate but also to give his campaign additional legitimacy in the eyes of believers.
Mechanisms of influence through TikTok: the anatomy of the electoral revolution
In 2019, TikTok in Romania had only 175 thousand users. By the beginning of 2024, the audience had grown to almost 9 million, almost half of the country’s population. At the same time, 9.28 million Romanians voted in the first round of the presidential election. The average user spends 32 hours a month on TikTok, more than an hour every day.
“In some ways, TikTok is like a TV channel that learns what shows we like,” – explains digital content expert Christian Bolokan. Contrary to popular belief that TikTok is a youth platform, the majority of TikTok’s audience in Romania is over 35 years old.
Eduard Diaconu, a 25-year-old marketer with experience in TikTok, reveals the mechanisms behind the success of Georgescu’s campaign: “The strategy is relatively simple, but effectively implemented. Almost all of the content posted is from podcasts and interviews, containing favorable moments and interesting topics. They are simply edited and have a song in the background that generates emotion.”
However, the key element was the massive use of bot farms – thousands of connected devices that created the illusion of mass support. “We know that bots were used for the ‘I vote for Kelin Georgescu’ comments because they were always the same and posted on popular videos in Romania that had nothing to do with politics,”Diaconu explains.
Georgescu’s team skillfully used the platform’s algorithms to create different content for different audiences:
- For young people – a message of change and struggle against the system
- for the older audience – appeals to traditions and sovereignty
- provocative statements that prompted debate in the comments section
““Essentially, the algorithm reacts to the message that generates an emotion,”Bolokan explains. “And if we know how to create messages with great emotional impact, we can understand the algorithm.”
The results are impressive: a few days before the election, Georgescu’s videos received 52 million views. 31% of voters aged 18-24 voted for him, while among the over-65s, the support was only 8%.
The content was simple but effective: church attendance, morning jogging, podcast appearances, simple messages about “traditional values.” At the same time, this simplicity hid radical ideas: criticism of NATO membership, praise for Putin as a “true world leader,” calls to stop aid to Ukraine, and the glorification of Romanian collaborators from World War II.
How Georgescu’s TikTok campaign was built: the anatomy of manipulation
A detailed analysis of the election campaign of Kelin Georgescu reveals a complex system of manipulations involving dozens of popular influencers. The key element of the strategy was the use of a special brief – a set of precise instructions for bloggers, which did not require naming the candidate, but necessarily used the hashtags “echilibrusiverticality” and “alegeriiprezidentiale2024“.
Influencers were attracted through the FameUp platform an “automated system based on artificial intelligence”where they were offered fixed-fee contracts. The typical remuneration was about 100 euros per video. At the same time, Georgescu himself officially reported “zero costs” for the campaign.
The mechanism worked as follows: popular bloggers were tasked with recording a video about what qualities the future president of Romania should have. Without naming specific names, they had to express support for theses that exactly coincided with the Georgescu program. Most of the influencers, who were far from politics, did not even realize that they were participating in a political campaign.
The case of the Graurii brothers, whose Graurii account has more than 230,000 followers, is illustrative. “Who would have thought that a month ago, when people didn’t know anything about Calin Georgescu, that our image would be associated with his name?”they later admitted . “We really thought it was an effort by an NGO to encourage people to go to the polls.”.
Medelina Ghoshoi, the founder of the community “Dragă viitoare mamă” with 91,000 subscribers, told a similar story: “I feel deeply deceived that my image is associated with the support of a man I did not know existed.”
The scale of the campaign was revealed by an investigation by GÂNDUL on November 12. The journalists found that it was a planned two-stage operation. The first stage was the creation of a “portrait of an ideal president”. The second is a massive campaign to promote a specific candidate who fits this portrait.
The investigation revealed that the direct organizer of the campaign was Fundament, which placed the order through the FameUp platform. The script for the influencers clearly stated that their speeches should only describe the qualities of an ideal president, without any mention of political preferences, candidates or parties.
When a journalistic investigation revealed the mechanism of the campaign, a massive deletion of videos began, and influencers restricted the ability to comment on those that remained. The hashtag #echilibrusiverticalitate, although it received a large number of posts, attracted attention for its unnaturalness – all posts had the same content and structure, which indicated a coordinated campaign.
Some Romanian influencers began to publicly expose the manipulation. “Many of the videos had the same language, the same short and, on top of that, the same logical structure. The problem is that these partnerships were apparently not marked as paid, even though they are paid, because some people even marked these ads,”Anna-Maria Udrishte told her TikTok followers.
Several special information operations were conducted to disguise the political nature of the campaign. In early November, the Romanian media published materials about “spontaneous discussion by Romanians of the qualities of the future president”. It was only ten days before the election that this campaign began to be associated with the name of Georgescu.
When the fact of manipulation became apparent, the candidate’s team distanced itself from the campaign. “We have nothing to do with this hashtag #echilibrusiverticality,” said campaign manager Radu Palli. Nevertheless, the result was achieved – a few days before the election, Georgescu’s videos received 52 million views.
Coordination of comments via Telegram is the next step in the campaign
Engaging influencers through the FameUp platform was only the first part of the Georgescu campaign. The second, no less important stage was the coordination of comments in support of the candidate through a network of Telegram channels.
G4Media.ro’ s investigation revealed a large-scale system of so-called “volunteers” – thousands of users organized into special groups on Telegram. Participants received ready-to-post materials and detailed instructions on how to leave comments on TikTok.
The central group was Propagandist-Revival of Romania, which quickly grew to 1,800 members. It was complemented by an extensive network of local groups for each county and district of Bucharest. Characteristically, many channels began to become active as early as July 2024, although some were created as early as November 2023.
In November 2024, the “volunteers” received several Word documents with transcripts of Georgescu’s speeches to be shared on TikTok. They also received clear instructions on how to comment: “Don’t spam, maybe add relevant words at the end” and “Change them every 5 comments, don’t comment quickly”.
To motivate participants, a system of “prizes” for the best publications was created. Groups held competitions for the title of the best “editor” of the year. At the same time, journalists found direct evidence of payment for such “volunteer” activities. “Be modest and you will get money if you stay with us and with our Mr. Kelin Georgescu”one of the coordinators answered the newcomers’ questions about payment.
Each “volunteer” managed one of hundreds of support accounts on TikTok. Some accounts had only dozens of subscribers, while others reached millions of views thanks to a constant posting strategy and algorithm support. It is noteworthy that the network turned out to be international – German-speaking users were found among the “volunteers”.
After Georgescu won the first round, the administrator of the central group congratulated the participants with a message: “You have written history! Stay calm”. This was a de facto acknowledgment of the role of the hidden network in the pro-Russian candidate’s unexpected electoral success.
Ukrainian realities: anti-mobilization campaigns
Romania’s experience demonstrates how effective TikTok can be as an instrument of political influence. These lessons are especially relevant for Ukraine, as we have been witnessing systematic attempts to use the platform to undermine the country’s defense efforts for years.
Our research reveals extensive networks of accounts that spread disinformation in a coordinated manner, for example, about mobilization. Their activities are based on several main narratives:
- exaggerating the losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
- spreading rumors about the “unfairness” of the mobilization process
- creating panic about the situation at the front
- Manipulative comparisons with other countries
As in the Romanian case, the success of these campaigns is largely based on the peculiarities of TikTok’s algorithm. The platform automatically promotes content that evokes strong emotional reactions and has a high level of interaction. Especially effective are videos that create a sense of “insider information” and use popular music tracks and trends.
We have repeatedly noticed a very similar mechanism of work. Similarly, the use of common hashtags, such as #tc, #valuemyukraine, #mogylization, and others, unites viewers with common interests and emotions. Later, this allows viewers to be united into Viber groups to coordinate resistance to mobilization, as was the case in Kosmach or Berezne, and to promote the respective Telegram and YouTube channels.
We also cannot fail to mention the electoral effect of the TV series “Servant of the People,” which, while not formally an election campaign, actually became the starting point of the presidential campaign. This sets a precedent for similar “hidden” campaigns in the future. For example, to fulfill the public demand for “military in power” when a pro-Russian candidate wins.
Given the experience of Romania, where a little-known candidate was able to achieve a stunning electoral success in a few months, it is critical for Ukraine:
- Strengthen monitoring of coordinated campaigns on TikTok
- Develop media literacy, especially among young people
- Train Ukrainian influencers to recognize and counteract manipulative technologies
- Create a system of rapid response to disinformation campaigns
Particular attention should be paid to the fact that successful campaigns on TikTok are often based on the promotion of values and ideas without direct reference to specific political forces. This makes them almost invulnerable to traditional mechanisms of control over political advertising.
Conclusions and recommendations
The analysis of the presidential campaign in Romania demonstrates the emergence of a fundamentally new type of political influence through social media, in particular TikTok. Unlike previous attempts to use social media for political campaigning, the Romanian case shows the effectiveness of a comprehensive approach that combines
- coordinated networks of influencers
- hidden payment for content
- centralized management via messengers
- using the features of the platform’s algorithms
Based on the analysis, InfoLight.UA predicts that the following trends will intensify:
- Increasing the number of coordinated campaigns before elections in different countries of the region. The success of Kelin Georgescu will inevitably lead to attempts to replicate this experience in other countries, especially where there is a significant pro-Russian audience.
- Development of new disinformation formats using artificial intelligence. We are already seeing the first attempts to use AI to create “organic” content and automate user interaction.
- Strengthening the impact on the youth audience by creating “organic” entertainment content. Special attention will be paid to formats that do not look like political campaigning.
- Formation of stable networks of pro-Russian influencers that can be quickly mobilized for coordinated campaigns.
For Ukraine, these trends pose particular risks, given the following:
- the ongoing war
- future election campaigns
- the presence of a significant TikTok audience
- activity of pro-Russian influence networks
In the following article, we will take a closer look at the specifics of the Ukrainian segment of TikTok and analyze specific examples of how the platform was used to destabilize the situation in the country.
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